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"..national identification and what it is believed to imply, can change and shift in time ,
even in the course of quite short periods. In my judgement this is the area of national
studies in which thinking and research are most urgently needed today." E.J.
Hobsbawm.{1990}.2
"Such circumstances led Moiloa {the Hurutshe chief} to the disconsolate observation in
1852 that he was no more than a" Dog of the Boers' "•'
Introduction.
Between the 3rd. and 12th. of March, 1994 South Africa witnessed, in dramatic media
coverage, the fall of Lucas Mangope's regime in the homeland of Bophuthatswana. Within
days an interim administration was put in place and in the democratic elections which
followed in April the North-West province, consisting of a sustantial portion of the
former Bophuthatswana, voted overwhelmingly for the African National Congress
(A.N.C.) which Mangope had for years prevented from operating in the region. His
overthrow was the second attempt to oust him. The first, in 1988, failed partly because it
was a military as opposed to popular uprising and because the 1988 coup attempt was
crushed by the intervention of the South African Defence Force. By 1994 however a
significant shift in political development had occured, and the National Party intervened
not to prop up Mangope but to oversee his departure from the political arena. The "mini-
revolution" in Bophuthatswana is memorable for two events which captured the
imagination of South Africans, if not the world. The first was the targeted looting of shops
and organisations in which Mangope and his Cabinet had interests, which turned later to
widescale looting. The second was the shooting.in cold blood, by a member of the
Bophuthatswana Defence Force, of white right wingers of the paramilitary Afrikaner
Weerstandsbeweging (AWB) who had entered the territory to assist Mangope in quelling
the uprising.
This paper traces the rise and fall of Mangope, a man who dictated the fortunes of over
two million peoplefor over a decade. It defines the ldologicai basis of Bophuthatswana and
analyses the various tactics and policies Mangope pursued to legitimate and sustain his
homeland fantasy. This essentially involved a reformulation of earlier apartheid ethnic
discourse. Although there was, from the mid-1990's a steady erosion of Mangope's
credibility and support we suggest that, in the period leading up to the elections he
1 Institute of Education and Depl. of History, University of Bophuthatswana. Thanks also to Tim Clynick for his
comments on sections of this work.
2 E.J.Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism Since 1780: Programmes, Myth, Reality, Cambridge University Press, 1990.
3 Cited in A. Manson, "The Hurutshe in the Marico District of the Transvaal, 1820-1913." Ph.D thesis, University of
Cape town 1990, from A Report dated 22 November 1852 by R. Moffat in R. Lovett, The History of the London
ary Soriety. 1795-1895. London 1899, p. 596.
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political order. This he did by seeking alliances with other ethnically-minded elites in the
region. The article also discusses how and at what point he overplayed his hand and placed
himself outside the bounds of legitimate political discourse and action.
Finally the paper examines the nature of the popular insurrection which toppled Mangope,
and assesses whether the populist nature of institutions which sprung up after his downfall
will sustain democratic practice in the former Bophuthatswana, which now encompasses a
large section of the North West Province. This however has to be balanced against the
political legacy of the Mangope era which retarded the emergence of a democratic political
culture to a greater extent than the South African white supremacist state managed to do
throughout the 1970's and 80's. This distinction between the Bantustan state and the
central South African state implies that we reject the view that the latter represented a
hegemonic force controlling totally its constituent parts. As recent events have shown the
homeland elites did not passively accept the functional dictates of the South African state
and succeded, within constraints, to restructure their own set of political, material and
ideological interests*
Our main argument in the Bophuthatswana context is that an elite powerholding group
restructured earlier apartheid ethnic discourse vis-a-vis, the impending social and economic
transformation in South Africa hoping to capture regional resources, knowing that the
establishment of a central, unified state would precipitate a crisis of accumulation and a
relocation of labour and capital. Thus it will be shown that appeals to "regionalism" and
"federalism" were a disguised or truncated version of "nation" or, perhaps, "regional
nationalism" as a political response to South Africa's political and economic restructuring.
We will contend that the earlier discourse and policy of independence and Batswana
nationhood that characterised the Bophuthatswana state was conceptually and materially
sculptured and blended into a regional\territorial concept. Notably, there was a
deracialisation or cleansing of the old "apartheid" discourse of "corporate federalism",
though ironically its new allies of the far right white still cling to outmoded racist
ideology.5 Woven into this was an inherent and perceived fear of being "pressed into a
corner" by a more powerful and numerous "Xhosa dominated" ANC." As Hobsbawm has
argued in a comparison of nineteenth and twentieth century nationalism, many recent "
national movements" are "defensive reactions", not concerned with "political modernity"
but " time and time again...reactions of weakness and fear, attempts to erect barricades to
keep at. bay the forces of the modern world."''
This, we argue, is the context in which Mangope's initiative to establish regional alliances
such as the Southern African Tswana Forum (SATSWA) should be seen. It was hoped that
4 There is a significant body of work on the relationship between the South African state and the Bantustans. See for
example R. Southall, South Africa's Transkei-The Political Economy of an "Independent Bantustan. London.
Heinemann, 1982; R. Tomlinson and M. Adelson, Regional Restructuring Under Apartheid, Johannesburg. Ravan, 1987;
M. Swilling (ed), TJlcS_o.uth.Ailican,State, Johannesburg, 1989.
5 Adelson and Tomlinson, Regional Restructuring, p.xiv.
6 As Hobsbawm argues, in an examination of the development of twentieth century nationalism, there is a
psychological component (open to manipulation) that "fuels such defensive reactions...whether against real or imaginary
threats" in response to" fundamental and unprecedented socio-economic transformations". See Nalions.and.NiUluiialisni.
p. lf.5.
7 Hobsbawm. Nations.and.Nalio.nalisin, p. 37.
3 •
this forum would give him leverage in a situation where their case for independence and a
form of confederalism would not find acceptance.
Allied with these objectives is the need to uncover precisely to whom did homeland
policies appeal, for the homeland was not created in a vacuum and Mangope has had to
seek some legitimation by appealing to elements within Bophuthatswana and beyond. The
article seeks to examine the ways Mangope's support base changed over time, for its
position within the South African political context determined to a large extent the way in
which the "reality" of Bophuthatswana was represented. It will be argued that in the 1950's
and 60's the base of his support lay in a rural constituency, but that this expanded, as
independence assumed a material reality, to include other interest groups in the mining,
agricultural and business sectors. The persistence of a rural based alliance has been rather
overshadowed by these other interests, but needs to be borne in mind particularly as it
provided the basis for Mangope's attempt to retain access to land in a regional
dispensation. In addition the creation and consolidation of a large homeland bureaucracy
helped enormously in broadening the social base of his support, though it was precisely the
shedding of support by this sector that led to his downfall.
Towards a Periodisation
Mangope's conception and discourse of ethnicity and nationalism resonated with a sense of
the Tswana past and reflected changing political developments and material conditions in
South Africa over the past forty years or so. We have identified sfiisn historical phases
which are of importance. The earlier phases he employed to give supposedly rational
arguments for his policies. These are
1) the precolonial period, characterised incorrectly as a time of Tswana unity and
integration with a clear hierarchy of authority,
2) the colonial period from c. 1820, especially the last half of the nineteenth century which
was characterised by Boer and British competition for domination of the Tswana,
3) the period marking his entry into politics during the apartheid era and the bantustan
formation years of the 1950's and 60's,
4) the espousal of non-racialism and flirtation with "liberal democracy" between about
1977-84, summed up in the title of Mangope's book "A Place for All"",
5) the late 1980's call for Pan-Tswanaism with Botswana and a reversal of the wrongs of
colonialism,
6) the time of intense "go it alone " nationalism coinciding with global nationalism
prompted largely by the dissolution of the U.S.S.R.in the 1990's and the resurgence of
ethnicity on the political agenda and finally 7) the South Africa Tswana Forum or
SATSWA option of March 1991 with its focus on a regional conservative alliance based
on mining and agricultural interests and its manifestation in the form of the Concerned
South Africans Group(COSAG). These are not entirely discreet phases; they often overlap
and reflect the shifting and sometimes contradictory nature of official Bophuthatswana
8 L M. Mangope, A Place (or All, Via Afrika, Johannesburg, 1978.
thought and discourse. To these phases we should add the final assessment of his fall and
legacy.
1 Precolonial
Two forms of Icgitimatory discourse seem to have been articulated regarding the ethnic
origins of "nations", both of which were applied by the homeland authorities and
ideologues. The first has been identified by Debray ' who points to two primary or
anthropological determinants that define the social construction of "nation". These are the
"delimitation of time" and the "assignation of origins". This fixing of a point of origin
allows for ritualisation which legitimises and reinforces the social group's identity
especially during periods of social, economic or political stress. This was most commonly
employed by the proponents of Tswana nationalism to suggest the irreversibility of a
Tswana " nation" built on a mythical past. This is encapsulated in a Tswana tradition that
they arose from a bed of reeds at Ntswana Tdatsi {Where the sun sets}. Thus, according to
such ideologues, the Tswana were delimited within an enclosed and identifiable space from
the origin of time. As was the case with the South African state's discourse of ahnos, the
unity of the Tswana was simply asserted. This is a highly problematic claim.
The Tswana nation was taken as given and, so the argument goes, it was only the British
who came and destroyed the fabric of Tswana nationhood in the colonial era. This view
was strongly held by Mangope himself and became embedded in official homeland
polemic. "The history of the Batswana nation", he is reported as saying to CODESA in
1992, "goes back to the 11th century when it inhabited the greatest portion of the country
north of the Orange river and south west of the Zambezi. We lived here as a sovereign and
free people until we suffered the fate of the northward expansion of colonial Britain".
From this it is concluded that "Bophuthatswana is not the product of apartheid but the
legacy of British imperialism and colonialism that went wrong."*® British disregard for the
Keate Award of 1871, which gave recognition to the land rights of some Tswana
chiefdoms, was generally regarded and presented as " an act of colonial betrayal".!'
The second ideolgical justification saw nationhood as being conferred through the granting
of "independence" by South Africa. Thus an officially sponsored study claimed that "of
major significance is the fact that while the Tswana lost their independence as tribes, they
regained it {in 1977} as a nation, encompassed within a Tswana state". 12
Though there is a certain commonality in the Tswana past built on the sharing of
conditions, circumstances and language we argue that these are false conceptions of the
Tswana past. Yet it has been the cornerstone on which Bophuthatswana has been built. In
short there was no Tswana "nation " and attempts to revive or re-create it rest on a false
9 "Marxism and the National Question". Interview with Regis Debray in NewXelt-Rcyiew, Scpl/Oct, 1977. p. 251.
10 The Mafikeng Mail. Supplement, 4 December 1992.
1 1 See Supplement to Jhe.Mafikeag.MfuX ** December 1992 under the heading "Bophuthatswana , A History of
Colonial Betrayal."
12 Anon. Zhe..Republic_o!J3_ophulhalswan.a, C. van Rensberg publications, Johannesburg, 1977, p.207.
assumption. While totemic forms of consciousness existed in precapitalist African societies,
the incorporation of these societies into a wider capitalist world "yielded novel ethnic
affiliations and groupings" of which the Tswana were one. As the work of the Comaroff's
has shown, the idea of a self-conscious Tswana ethnic identity cannot be traced back to the
mists of time. Tswana identity was constructed mostly from the outside by agents of
colonialism who had a distorted view of the structure, organisation and cultural symbols
of the people they classified. This process involved the participation of the indigenous
people under the stimulus of the colonial order.!-' Thus Tswana ethnic consciousness was
a phenomenon that emerged and spread unevenly from the latter half of the nineteenth
century, supplanting totemic forms of consciousness that existed within autonomous
chiefdoms living in the area prior to the colonial period. It is ironic that these colonial
agents, who provided a conception of the collective Tswana identity used to advance
Tswana ethnic consciousness, were accused by Mangope of betraying the Tswana and
depriving them of their rightful and historic homeland. Nationhood is however an
emotionally powerful, credible and convenient rallying point and an argument which no
doubt appeals to many audiences, a fact which perhaps explains why Mangope was allowed
to address the United Nations Security Council.
What Mangope and others confused and conflated is this sense of commonality with a
sense of community. As Pieterse explains "ethnic identity comprises many different modes
along a wide spectrum ranging from objective markers to subjective identifications." ^
There are then fundamental differences between ethnic category/group, ethnic community
or ethnicity and ethno-nationalism. The first may be defined in terms of "objective cultural
markers" (language, dialect, dress, custom, religion,etc.), the second is an ethnic category
"that has adopted one or more of its marks of cultural distinctiveness and used them as
symbols both to create internal cohesion and to differentiate itself from other ethnic
groups".15 In this sense "ethnicity is to ethnic category what class consciousness is to
class." 16 Central to this process is ethno-nationalism involving the politicisation of ethnic
community .
The constant reference to, and refrain upon the precolonial and colonial past thus was
important as it provided a set of organising principles upon which to sculpture the new
state. Central to this organisation was the institution of legitimate traditional authorities.
In Tswana societies chiefs were the cornerstone of political organisation and activity and
derived material power from their control of the land and other resources, particularly
cattle. Chiefs were paid tribute (sehuba) but were expected to dispense patronage and to
ensure that the needy did not suffer. Chiefs who overstepped the bounds of their authority
and privilege or failed to carry out their duties to society could be forced out of office. The
ultimate sanction against a recalcitrant chief was desertion by his followers.
13 See for example J.Comaroff and J. Comaroff, Ethnography and the Historical Imagination. Chapter two, (Wcstview
Press, 1992.)
14 J. N. Pieterse," The Varieties of Ethnic Politics and Ethnicity Discourse", Conference on Ethnicity, Rhodes
University, 1993.
1 5 PR. Brass, F.ihnicity and Nationalism: Theory and Comparison. (New Delhi), Sage, I99l,p.263
16 Piotcrse, "Varieties of Ethnic Politics", p. 5.
Mangopc, as a traditional leader (though by no means paramount Tswana chief) had a
profound sense of what he was owed with correspondingly little sense of his dbhgations.
The constitutional power he wielded as President of a state with no official opposition
meant that he could exercise his chiefly control with little threat- in short the kind of
precolonial sanctions mentioned above were removed, giving him the best of both worlds.
Employing a conception of the tradititional powers vested in chiefs during precolonial
times, Mangope frequently resorted to removing chiefs opposed to him from office. In
Phokeng chief Lebone Molatlegi was deposed and his wife deported, and in Taung chief
Mankurwane met the same fate. Both are paramount chiefs, no less senior to Mangope
himself. In Braklaagte the Sebogodi family was ousted for opposing reincorporation to
Bophuthatswana though they clearly held majority support in the village. These represent
the most flagrant cases but other instances of interference also can be cited. Mangope thus
was concerned about his rural constituency and determined not to let go his grip on rural
affairs. The earlier "organising principles " of precolonial social structure were thus been
carried through from the past to the era of modern apartheid and manipulated to suit the
particular needs of the ethnically based state. This created a distortion of the nature of
precolonial social organisation. As many scholars have noted, the Tswana mejafe
frequently absorbed groupings from outside, especially during the Difaqane period in the
1820's, and showed widely divergent ethnic origins. Far from being exclusive, Tswana
society was structured in such a way as to allow and cope with inclusion.
Mangope's construction of the ethnic state encompassed a view that corresponds closely
with Brass1 idea of inter-ethnic struggle for resources, based on certain rights.!'' At
independence non-Tswana's believed the Constitution Act and the Bill of rights would
protect them but there has been since that time a consistent campaign against them. At the
end of the |970's there was for example harassment in the form of police raids against non-
Tswana's opposed to independence in the Odi-Moretele region. The early 80's witnessed
further "official harassment" of non-Tswana's in the form of denial of work permits,
citizenship and pensions. The time from 1983 to about 1986 Keenan periodises as the
"Nigerian" option!" - when two million migrants, mainly Ghanains, were expelled.
Bophuthatswana amended the Land Control Act to redefine non-Tswana citizens as
squatters to provide legal legitimacy for their eviction. From 1986 discrimination against
non-Tswana's has not been followed with any particular determination {though it did not
stop} because the state's attention began to focus more on the growing threat posed by the
resurgence of forces within South Africa opposed to the Bantustan system.
The Colonial Period
An aspect of Bophuthatswana's interpretation of its position rested on historical
circumstances going back to the colonial period. Basically, this period was characterised by
competition for the land and resources of the Tswana between the British and the Boers of
17 Brass, P. E\hnic.Gr«Up.S and-lhc_State. London, Croon Helm, (1985).
18 J. Keenan. "Pandora's Box: The Private Accounts of a Bantustan Local Authority" , So.uth-Alr.ican JUvicw,
1986.
the South African Republic. However the Tswana themselves were divided in their
reaction to external pressures, some communities strategically allying with the Boers to
settle old scores with their traditional rivals, some becoming total dependents of the Boer
Republics, and others siding with British imperial interests. The Tshidi Barolong on the
one hand and the Ratlou and Rapulana factions on the other became longstanding enemies
due to the fact that the South African Republic attempted to advance its land claims
through its allies, the Ratlou and Rapulana. Similarly, factions of the Tlhaping were torn
even further apart by taking sides in the struggle between Boers and the British for control
of the region. Other communities, like Moiloa's Hurutshe, were subject to intense
demands for labour and tax, that led to the self-deprecatory remark, cited in the title, that
he was no more than a "Dog of the Boers".
Ironically {in the light of recent initiatives to form an alliance with local Afrikaners} it
was in Mmabatho, the stronghold of Bophuthatswana, that the Barolong people in the
187O's and 188O's were subject to the most intense pressure on their lands from mainly
Boer freebooters. Moreover Tswana chiefdoms subject to Boer hegemony were forced to
enter into complex and often contradictory relationships with their rulers that involved
both co-operation and resistance. As will be seen later BritishXBoer conflict and the false
notion of an uncomplicated and persistent AfnkaneATswana unity again have surfaced in
the discourse and initiatives of homeland politics.
Bantustan Formation
Thus echoes of the precolonial and colonial past reverberated around the political arena
and in the Bophuthatswana media to justify, explain or rationalise certain actions and
policies. Ironically though Mangope cannot lay claim to significant chiefly status. Let us
turn now to examine this key individual on whom the edifice of Bophuthatswana rested
and around whom Tswana identity was built in terms of the Grand Apartheid system.
Mangope is from the Bahurutshe chiefdom, most of whom have long inhabited a reserve to
the north of Zeerust. The Mangope clan was at one time a senior one amongst the
Hurutshe but did not occupy land in the reserve. In the mid-nineteenth century the
Mangope faction moved to modern Botswana. They returned some twenty years later but,
having once departed the area, were obliged formally to accept the authority of the
Bahurutshe ba Gopane who allowed them to settle in the reserve at Motswedi, within the
area of their authority. Only in 1941 was the independence of the Hurutshe at Motswedi
recognised, an act which offended the Gopane chiefs but which endeared the Mangope
chiefly family to the government. Circumstances then played into the hands of the
Mangope family. Though the Moiloa family based at Dinokana were recognised as the
Hurutshe paramounts, in 1957-58 Abram Moiloa was in the forefront of the "Hurutshe
revolt" against the taking of passes and was deposed and fled to Botswana. As most of the
Moiloa family had supported Abram, and were A.N.C. members, the Bantu Affairs
Department then cast around for a traditional authority that would administer affairs
according to the dictates of Departmental policy. At this time the reserve had been
earmarked to become the first Regional Authority in the Transvaal, a first step on the
route to the Bantustan policy devised by the architects of "Grand Apartheid". Thus it was
doubly necessary to find a chief who would be compliant with state policy. The obvious
choice was Lucas Mangope, father of the future president of Bophuthatswana, and chief at
Motswedi. Not only was Mangope beholden to the government for conferring
independent status on him, but he had openly sided with the government in the
disturbances of 1957-58. He died before he could be appointed but on the 7 August 1959
his son was installed head of the Bahurutshe Tribal Authority.^ At the ceremony Chief
Lucas "delighted his critics by imploring the Minister of Bantu Administration to ' lead us
and we shall try to crawl'".20 This behaviour and simpering apologia was the apotheosis
of the language of bantustan subservience.
Two key points thus emerge from this account of the origins of the Tswana bantustan and
the Mangope family's role. First, Mangope's claim to paramountcy, even over the
Bahurutshe, (let alone over other Tswana communities) has little validity. It is of course
largely immaterial whether homeland leaders have legitimacy- even if they do it does not
legitimate the system- but Mangope justified his control over tribal structures partly on the
grounds that he is a chief of significant status. This status, as we have indicated, stems more
from his appointment to head of the Tribal Authority than to genuine paramountcy.
The second point to note is that it is apparent that Mangope's position was created and
underwritten by the South African state. From the very start of his career, he aligned
himself with the South African authorities and was a key player in their plans for the
creation of Bophuthatswana. In 1961 he became deputy of the Tswana Territorial
Authority and in 1972 he secured enough support to become chief minister of the self-
governing bantustan of Bophuthatswana.
Though Mangope's rise to power was due entirely to the policies of the South African
government, the idea of forging a Tswana identity which could be promoted to advance
the interests of Tswana people in relation to other ethnic groups had been rooted in a
legacy of identity formation propagated by important figures in the nineteenth century.
Thus the idea of a given Tswana "nation" is not only rooted in "traditionalist" thinking.
As much literature on ethnicity in Africa has argued,2'it is a notion reinforced, often
invented, by "cultural brokers", such as missionaries, intellectuals, anthropologists and
others who provide rational argument or scientific "evidence" for peoples' definitions of
self or social constructions of reality. Missionaries such as Moffat forged a sense of cultural
identity, bearing the imprint of Christian Europe, by standardising the Tswana language
and translating the Bible into Setswana." It was Moffat who coined the term "Tswana " to
give a historical and social construct to the people among whom he worked. Tswana
intellectuals in the early nineteenth century formed themselves into organisations such as
the Barolong National Council and the Barolong Progressive Association to promote their
19 SeeJ.Drummondand A. Manson. "The Transformation of Moiloa's Reaserve in the Western Transvaal, 1919-1848"
Paper to Canadian African Studies Association, Montreal, 1992.
2 0 T.Lodge, Black Politics in South Africa Since 1945, Johannesburg,l98}, p.278.
2 1 See Vail, Rectcaliojl_oU>ibaliilll and the work of Patrick Harries.
22 See Comaroff and Comaroff. ThtHistoricaliraawnauon, pp.252-25.1.
broad interests under the banner of Tswana ethnicity. 23 S.M. Molema, the renowned
author and historian, in his later years praised Mangope for his decision to take
independence.24
If there was a body of intellectual backing for the idea of a Tswana nation there was also a
more material source of support for the taking of "independence". This lay in the emergent
elites which had established themselves in the Tswana reserves and appreciated the
advantages to be gained from being the beneficiaries of commercial enterprises in the
reserves which had formerly been the preserve of whites and Indians. Case studies reveal
that this category of entrepreneur formed an alliance with certain chiefs and were
supported by state officials of the Native Affairs Department in the 1940's and 5O's.25
According to Clynick there was also an alliance between capitalising white Afrikaner
farmers and the bantustan apparachik that was later to pave the way for the entry of co-
operatives into Bophuthatswana and a development model based on technocratic
management of agriculture through Agricor, the parastatal set up to promote
agriculture.26 The significance of this alliance has often been overlooked though it has not
been disguised. Mangope himself was a active commercial farmer, as were many of his
significant political supporters and this agricultural strategy has benefitted this class at the
expense of the former African tenants thrown off white farms and relocated in the
homeland. As will be seen later the idea of a Tswana\Afrikaner rural oligarchy {with the
addition of a mineral exploiting component} was given more formal substance towards the
end of Mangope's political career.
We contend therefore that there existed certain social forces and interest groups who
sought, successfully as it transpired, to use the homeland edifice as a basis for further
accumulation. There was during the late 60's and 1970's a growing economic chasm
between this class and masses of dispossessed African producers thrown off black spots or
white farms and resettled in the homeland.
At a later stage only did the Bophuthatswana regime consolidate and expand its support
through the creation of a large bureaucracy whose support it was able to capture through
job creation, fear and patronage. This never constituted a loyal constituency and this
bureaucracy, as events proved, switched allegiances with little difficulty to the African
National Congress which it believed could offer better opportunities. Initially Mangope's
support therefore rested on mainly on a narrow rural elite and a questionable traditional
authority on whom he counted and to whose interests he looked. This necessitated an
ongoing and energetic propaganda campaign to unite the inhabitants of Bophuthatswana
23 For ihc Barolong National Council see the work of T.CIynick, forthcoming. For the Barolong Progressive
association see C. Murray,
24 Personal communication, Jane Starfield,1993. See also the Manuscript by S.M.Molema on " History of the Barolong";
A.D.6.1 Molema Papers, University of the Witwatersrand, where he talks approvingly of Mangope's role in "creating an
opportunity for a wider scope for service" by taking "self-rule".
25 See the work of J.Drummond and A.Manson, "The Rise and Demise of African Agricultural Production in Dinokana
Village, Bophuthatswana, 1919-1988". Canadian journal of African Studies, vol.23 no.3, (1993)
26 This view is emerging in the work of Tim Clynick who is examining the evolution of the Tswana based reserves in
llic twrntielh cenlury.
under the banner of "Tswanaism", and to strive for international recognition on the basis
that it constituted a nation.
"A Place for All"
After attaining independence the leaders of Bophuthatswana switched to a new line of
argument in persuance of recognition as a soverign state. Independence offered the chance
to establish a non-racial society at a time when South Africa itself was still in the grip of
apartheid. Bophuthatswana was thus presented as "A Place for All", a haven of non-
racialism. In respects this had some foundation but it also served as a propagandist
opportunity . Accompanying this was an attempt to portray Bophuthatswana as a "liberal
democracy" with a Bill of Rights with in-built protection for the rights of individuals.
Central to this was the use of key ideological state apparatus, in particular formal
education, to provide for the social and cultural reproduction of a form of Batswana
identity and history, similar to the Botswana nation building Kagiso Education
Commission. In particular geography and history text books provided the curricula
foundations for the delimitations of space and time respectively. At the level of tertiary
education the establishment of an Institute of African Studies at the University of
Bophuthatswana for example largely provided for an ideological base for a particular type
of Tswana studies affording cultural brokerage for government.27
This type of argument however could not be sustained, for two reasons.Firstly it was
designed mainly to appeal to an international audience and had little relevance for the
masses who, desperate for jobs and security, viewed outsiders or "foreigners" as
competitors and were more likely to buy the notion of exclusive ethnic nationalism. The
"place for all" strategy was thus inherently contradictory, particularly as it was persued
simultaneously with the denial of work permits, citizenship, and pensions to non-
Tswana's.
Secondly it became clear that Bophuthatswana was not a place for political opponents as
well. It was noted for example that the very last Section (18.1) in the Bill of Rights
specified that other laws could override the Bill of Rights. These included the Internal
Security Act and the Security Clearance Act which were increasingly used to suppress
political opponents and organisations.28 Political repression in Bophuthatswana was
thrown more sharply into focus by the rise of popular resistance, manifested by the
formation and growth of the United Democratic Front, the Congress of South African
Trade Unions and student organisations, which began to actively oppose the homeland
system. In 1990 a state of Emergency was declared to enable the state to deal more
effectively with the "threat" to Bophuthatswana's independence. Adding to this decline in
the "democratic image" of Bophuthatswana was the exclusion of non-Tswana's and the
eradication of rural powerbases opposed to Mangope's rule referred to earlier. The
situation thus became reversed- as there was an increasing degree of political tolerance in
South Africa there was a rising intolerance in Bophuthatswana. From about 1985 the
rhetoric of free political expression ceased to be heard in Bophuthatswana ruling circles.
2 7 See Popagano Report /Education Commission, 1978 and N.C5LLoQk.Matlhaie.di, vol.11, no.l.
28 See "Problems in the Creation of a climate for free Political Opposition in Bophulhalswana", Mafikcn^ Anli-
Rcpression Forum, 1991.
Pan-Tswanaism
By the late 198O's the idea of presenting Bophuthatswana as a liberal democratic state was
no longer tenable and, with an upsurge of political activity in South Africa and the
concomitant demand for a unitary state, Mangope turned in the early 1980's to embrace
enthusiastically the notion of Pan -Tswanaism. Of course this derived from the idea of the
all encompassing Tswana nation. But he used this concept to propagate an idea that was
essentially novel. The British, by dividing the Tswana "Nation" in 1885 when the
distinction was made between the Protectorate and British Bechuanaland (later annexed to
the Cape and thus becoming part of South Africa), were now held responsible for
depriving the Tswana in South Africa of the independence enjoyed by their kin in
Botswana.^' While it was true that the British had laid down a arbitrary border it did not
in fact divide a "Nation" though it certainly did divide certain chiefdoms, such as the
Hurutshe and Rolong, from their kinsfolk. However this line of argument shifted the
debate back to the colonial era, and exonerated the proponents and executers of
segregation and apartheid. The shift to British colonialism provided the opportunity to re-
assign the origins of the contemporary Tswana political condition in order to provide a
legitimatory basis for three broad objectives.
First to absolve his own collaborative role in the reproduction of the apartheid state,
second to provide an expedient and identifiable discourse and rationale for his claims to
international recognition, articulated in such fora as the United Nations and the British
House of Commons, and lastly to provide a basis for the forging of an alliance with
conservative interests in the region who have a common abhorrence for British
colonialism and a belief that nations have a right to self-determination. In addition to these
legitimating objectives, this rhetoric helped to counter internal pressures against
Bophuthatswana's independence.
The appeal for independence based on Pan-Tswanaism failed, primarily and most
ironically because it was rejected by the very people with whom Mangope felt himself
historically embraced- the Tswana of Botswana. Botswana, though recognising language
and other cultural links between its citizens and those people resident in Bophuthatswana,
refused to recognise Bophuthatswana's independence.^ This led to an ambivalent attitude
whereby on the one hand Bophuthatswana appealed to a sense of common Tswana
identity whilst on the other it exerted pressure on Botswana to force that country into low
level diplomatic contact and negotiations. In 1982 for example Bophuthatswana
constructed a dam which drew water from the major source for the Gaborone dam. In the
arguments which followed Bophuthatswana insisted that Botswana negotiate directly with
her instead of South Africa, calling in addition for "a round table conference ...with the
29 This point is made by Dnimmond. "According to this line of reasoning Bophuthatswana was not a child of apartheid
but rather the bastard offspring of British colonial rule in Southern Africa'. DrummondJ. 'Reincorporating the
Bamustans into South Africa: The Question of Bophuthatswana", Orography. 76, (1991), PP. 396-373.
3 0 In 1977 President'Scretse Khama referred to Bophulhatswana when it atained independence as a "child of Apartheid",
Maliliejlg-Msil, 1 July '977.
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establishment of diplomatic relations".^In 1986\87 Bophuthatswana took advantage of its
geopolitical situation in southern Africa to exert pressure on Botswana whilst
simultaneously maintaining its calls for diplomatic links. On this occasion
Bophuthatswana placed a visa restriction on Botswana citizens which effectively closed the
border and severely disrupted road and rail links between Botswana, Bophuthatswana and
the R.S.A. The rationale behind this action was made abundantly clear when Mangope
warned at the annual Independence celebration that "if Botswana cannot change its foreign
policy on Bophuthatswana and continues with its mud-slinging, then Bophuthatswana will
have no option but to retaliate."32
A further reason why the idea of a fully united Tswana state failed was because it is the
stated policy of the Organisation of African Unity that the colonial boundaries should
remain as they were at the time of independence of the member states. Thus with the pan-
Tswanaism concept fairly well dead and buried {though not entirely; its appeal is to strong
for certain die hard nationalists} the homeland regime sought new arguments to legitimise
its continued existence.
Global Nationalism
Fortuitously the events precipitated by the collapse of the former Soviet Union and the
revival of nationalist sentiments and actions in the various republics gave added impetus to
arguments for nationhood and ethnicity. Though this was never a clear or fully separate
phase of a search for respectable political discourse, there was nevertheless a regular
searching for other examples or political arguments for nationhood, of which the growth
of nationalist sentiment and movements in the Soviet Union was just one, albeit powerful,
justification for status as an independent nation.
Israel's determination to preserve its identity and status as a nation was seen as a source of
inspiration for the newly created Batswana nation in Bophuthatswana. For example the
Minister of Information at an independence day celebration at the Bophuthatswana Trade
Mission in Israel drew comparisons between the two countries. He noted that the
"similarities between the founding of Israel and those of the Botswana in regaining their
promised land are truly remarkable".33 This explains the close relationship that grew
between Bophuthatswana and Israel. Since 1977 there were regular exchanges and national
development initiatives. Israeli advisors and businessmen frequently visited and were given
favourable positions and contracts in Bophuthatswana.
Similarly dignitaries arrived from the Ukraine at the Bophuthatswana Independence
celebrations in 1992 to "foster goodwill" and to "teach us about the newly independent
Ukraine", and its struggles to distance itself from the Russian state. In 1992 a trade advisor,
31 JUrc.Mafikcng.Mail. 20 May I98.V
32 Sec TJlc.MafikcnR.Miul, 12 December 1986. For a Kilter account of the episode see J.Drummond and A. Mansnn.
"The Evolution and Cnnpcinpnrary Significance of the Bophuthalswana-Botswana Border Landscape", in I). Rnml.v
and J. Minghi(eds.), The Geography of Bo.r.ikrJ.aadseapej, Routledgc, London. 1991.
33.Mafikcng.Mail, 4 IVc. 1992.
doubling as an "ambassador", was sent off to Riga to form relations with the newly
independent state of Latvia. Subsequently in July 1993 Mangope and some advisors visited
Latvia to strengthen this link by the opening of the Information Service of
Bophuthatswana (ISOB). In an address to the Latvian Foreign Affairs Committee,
Mangope proceeded to lay an ideological foundation for a possible future relationship
based on drawing out historical similarities between the two. He noted that they "have
many things in common - including the fear of communism, which in South Africa is a
threat in the form of the A.N.C."^ He concluded that the irony of their two histories"
will not be lost on the Latvians when I tell you that the masterminds behind the sinister
plot to seize total power in our region are drawn from the ranks of the South African
Communist Party (and) ...the the African National Congress who are still committed to
classic communist doctrine in spite of its disastrous consequences and its abject failure
wherever it has been allowed to poison society."^
This East European ethnic discourse and policy captured the imagination of the
Bophuthatswana media. An editorial noted Yugoslavia's release from the "yoke of
communism" and the fact that this led not to "rejoicing" but a "bloody war between
different ethnic groupings in the territory". It lauded what it saw as "a democratic solution
to the problem by the United Nations to stop this warring between the Serbs, Croats and
Muslims." The solution, it observed, is based on a "brokered ceasefire in terms of which
the country will be broken up into ethnic states." Significantly convoluted and crude
analogies are made with the "National Party arguments in favour of apartheid and the
division of ethnic groups" premised historically on the fact that these ethnic groups "did
not get on and separation would prevent violence." •'"
However events within South Africa, especially from 1990, tended to focus attention more
on national as opposed to international developments. The resurgence of global
nationalism did however provide a useful background to Bophuthatswana's later attempt
to find respectability and the chance for continuity as a separate ethnically based nation.
SATSWA-The Southern African Tswana Forum.
Bophuthatswana's SATSWA initiative must be seen against the background of Mandela's
release, the CODESA negotiations, and the reality of South African restructuring leading
towards a unitary state dispensation. Behind the scenes activity and informal debates about
this imminent restructuring led, on the 15 March 1991, to the first official meeting of
interest groups in the region to explore a wide range of issues including agriculture,
mining, business, education, health, social services and rural development. This provided
the basis for a conference on regional government convened on 23 March 1992. The social
basis and support for this initiative comprised 320 Bophuthatswana government and
34.Mafikcng.Mail. July 9, 1993.
35 Qnolc.l in MalikcngJ^ail, 9 July 1993.
36Ma(ikci>eMail.7May 1991.
parastatal officials, academics from the Universities of Bophuthatswana and Potchefstroom
and also regionally based farmers and businessmen, including some mining interests.
From this evolved the idea of regional consolidation referred to by the Star as a " Tswana-
Boereland superstate."-'' This plan would lead to a region which would be the second
largest in size, encompassing most of present Bophuthatswana, large portions of the
Orange Free State, including Bloemfontein, parts of the Northern Cape, including
Kimberley and Upington.{See Map} Provision was also made for the farming areas and
agricultural interests of Ellisras, Thabazimbi and Nylstroom in the north-western
Transvaal. As Drummond notes the aim of SATSWA was "to promote a 'greater
Bophuthatswana', which would incorporate and guarantee white farming interests, against
an envisaged centralist state".•"* The population of the.area was projected to be about 6.3
million inhabitants {56% Tswana speaking}. It would have a Gross Geographic Product
{GGP} of 239 billion Rand comprising, inter alia, 60% mining interests, 11% commerce
and industry and 3% agriculture. The mining interest was based on large geological studies
on mineral deposits of platinum, chrome, iron, manganese, gold, asbestos, tin, diamonds,
copper, zinc and lead.
Mangope's presentation to a meeting of the Forum on the 26 March 1992 was both
informative and instructive in its construction of Batswana history and in its attempt to
forge a new set of material interests for the region.
At the outset his address was concerned about the tendency to homogenise the TVBC
states. He lamented the trend to generalise in lumping all the TVBC states together as if
they were a "homogenous group or single entity." ^9 The adoption of the notion of ethnic
difference from the other states is clearly spelt out and perceived in terms of "history",
"development", "economy", "achievements" and " apart from other reasons, because we
are a democracy." Most important Mangope claimed emphatically that "we are an
independent nation" and "not a product of apartheid". His historical grounds for this
interpretation is premised on the "fact" that in 1977 "we regained the independence which
the British so treacherously took from us at the turn of the last century" .40
The appeal for regionalism was constructed and argued against a perceived fear of the "idea
of one unitary state based on a "one man one vote situation and the winner takes all"
alternative. Mangope argued that a "logical solution" to this fear is "the devolution of
power to regional governments." The basis and success this regionalism rested on the
notion of bringing together "groups of people who share the same basic values, norms and
beliefs".
3 7 J h t i u r , March 27, 1993.
38 J. Drummond, "The Demise of Territorial Apartheid: Retncorporaling the Bantustans in a ' New' South Africa",
Tijdschrih voor Efnnnnmhp <*n Sociale Geografie. 5, (1991),p.343.
3 9 See The Mafikirng Mail. 4 Dcember 1992. 'There is no doubt that in the minds of all South African leaders, that
Bophuthatswana is seen as uniquely different from any olher in the former or present homelands. It occupies a special
place."
4 0 These quotations come from President Mangope's address to the SATSWA Forum.
At this point Mangope's address significantly shifted its tack by employing Afrikaans as a
linguistic medium. The "Afrikaner en die Batswana" are seen "in vele opsigte dieselfde
waardes, geloof, en norme handhaaf "{In all respects to have the same values, beliefs and
norms}. These "same values" are grounded in beliefs of "Christlike-beginsels" { Christian
principles}, "vreedsame naasbestaan" {peaceful co-existence}, "onderskryf deur beginsels
van die vrye mark stelsel" {commitment to the free enterprise system} and faith in " waade
aan ons tradities , ons taal en ons geskiedenis" {worth in our own traditions, our language
and our history}.
While the material bases and anticipated social support for this regionalism was not
evident at this juncture of the address Mangope did make a strong psychological appeal to
both perceived and imaginary threats to this co-existence. He for instance made reference
to a "vn ou Tswana spreekwoord" {an old Tswana saying}; "Fifing go tshwaranwa ka
dikobo" translated into Afrikaans as " waneer dit donker is moet ons aan mekaar se
komberse of klere vashou" {when it becomes dark we must together hold on to each
others blankets and clothes.} This darkness was metaphorically projected into the then
South African political crisis and debates around a unitary South Africa:
"Breer vertaal sou dit kon beteken dat, in tye van nood en gevaar, moet ons mekaar se
hande vat en saam die toekoms aandurf. Ek glo dat nou, meer as ooit tevore die tyd
aangebreek het dat die Afrikaner en die Batswana in die Westlike gebiede van Suider
Afrika meekar se hande moet vat en met moed en geloof aan 'n nuwe toekoms werk"
{Broadly translated it can mean that in times of need and danger we must embrace each
others hands and embrace the future together. I believe that now, more than ever, the
Afrikaner and the Batswana in the western part of Southern Africa must take each others
hands and with determination and conviction work towards a new future.}
This response to political darkness and future uncertainty was not limited by Mangope to
the contemporary South African political crisis. Indeed Mangope refered to the
"sewentiende eeu" {seventeenth century} when n'n teen woordigheid en beskawing in die
gebied Suid en Wes van die Zambesie gevestig het". It was as a result of this threat that the
Batswana " saam men Griekwa en Voortrekker moes ons veg teen vyandige boorlinge en
impis wat ons Christelike geloof en beskawingspeil bedreig het." {The Batswana stood
together with the Griqua and voortrekkers against the enemy tribes and regiments that
threatened their Christian belief and civilisation} Against this historical interpretation
Mangope, in addition to assuming a typical colonial discourse, guaranteed his audience
that they could rest assured {"u kan gerus"} that this historical period was a clear
indication of the "noue bande wat daar in die verlede tussen Afrikaner en Tswana bestaan
het." {The close bonds that have existed between Afrikaner and Tswana.}
The documents presented at SATSWA which provided the reasoning and various
justifications for it, require comment on two levels. Firstly, historically one can detect
again the falsification to suit particular ends. The Tswana are presented as a homogenous
entity who acted with one intention arid with one interest. In fact the various chiefdoms
assumed differing attitudes and tactics to the imposition of white domination. Moreover
by the beginning of the twentieth century, if not before, Tswana society had become
sufficiently differentiated for separate groups and classes to act independently towards
white farmers and capitalists. In addition the notion of Tswana/Afrikaner unity in the past
is presented as given and uncomplicated, whereas relationships were fraught with conflict
and contradiction. Certainly collaboration, even co-operation, was one tactic resorted to
by Tswana chiefs. But these tactics were not based on any notion of a common identity.
Rather they were short-lived, pragmatic and accommodating, and Tswana leaders were just
as prone to follow a path of opposition and noncooperation.'" However in the SATSWA
discourse this presumed unity was elevated to a truism while at the same time the
differences between the Tswana and other major African chiefdoms, especially the Zulu
and Xhosa, are exaggerated and highlighted to preserve a regional identity in the face of the
threat of absorption into a unitary state dominated by more powerful and numerous
forces.
Secondly, in a contemporary sense this "unity" is projected into the present to provide the
basis for regional cooperation. Thus the documents refer to the regional sense of
communality or regional loyalty which "should be taken into account". Ethnicity is not
obscured; in fact it is the point of reference for the regional dispensation. While admitting
that in the historical past the "criterion" of ethnicity "achieved mixed success" and,
"because of its racial connotations...should be avoided in future demarcation
considerations", the documents however add that the "fact is that ethnicity cannot be
ignored and that culture, language, religion and traditions need to be taken into
consideration in any future demarcation".^ Or, as one senior Bophuthatswana official put
it, the "ANC wants to play down the difference of ethnic groups...but we cannot accept
that4-'". The threat of loosing control of access to jobs and material benefits was strongly
stated as a justification for a regional dispensation. For example the fear of possible loss of
jobs in the bureaurcracy to returning exiles is expressed by senior officials in the Public
Service Commission. The ANC Regional Proposals, which advocate a region comprising
the present Transkei, Border and Ciskei are interpreted as an attempt to hold on to an
ethnic powerbase and are advanced as a reason to allocate resources on a regional and
ethnic basis to Bophuthatswana. The ANC and National Party "alliance" was seen as
operating "primarily for the benefit of an urban bourgeoisie and the Xhosa ethnic group"
and " all others would be excluded from full participation in the benefits of political
patronage."
The Bophuthatswana/ Conservative Party alliance was then seen as being
counterhegemonic to the ANC/NP alliance. The SATSWA option was a purely
functionalist and manipulative exercise, prompted by material threats and justified on
specious and questionable grounds. It obscured obvious class divisions which existed in the
region and assumed a kind of consential homogeneity. At the same time however the
initiative was aimed at creating a form of inter-ethnic class based cooperation.
41 For an example of this see A.Manson. "The Hurutshe and the Formation of the Transvaal Siaie, ISM-1870.
Intf rnational Journal of African Historical Studies, vol. 2 1992."
4 2 See SATSWA document 1 ."Regional Government for the Western Transvaal, BophuthalswaiKi and ihr Northern
Cape, and Document 2 "SATSWA Regional Demarcation Proposal."
43 Cited in Jeffrey, Conflirt in Bophuthatswana.p.lRV
This flirtation with right wing politics was taken a step further with the formation of the
Concerned South African Group (COSAG), comprising broad conservative interest
groups including the Inkatha Freedom Party, the Conservative Party and Parties in the
Ciskei. This alliance was formed to oppose emergent and more powerful political forces.
This eventually coalesced into the Freedom Front to fight the A.N.C. on the one hand and
the National Party on the other. By late 1993 Mangope had firmly, placed his future in a
nationally based right wing alliance.
Toward.'; The Insurrection of March 1994.
As the crisis deepened in Bophuthatswana the government's actions became more and
more politically extreme, undermining the very basis of its previously rational and
seemingly "fair" contestation for the region. The main reason for this irrational extremism
lay in the growing opposition to the government from within and the shrinking social
base from which the state operated. At the forefront of opposition were students and
school pupils who in the first half of 1993 mounted strong protests against the Mangope
administration. The University was at varying times closed or was on strike and Colleges
of Education, Manpower Training Centres and the Technicon likewise were plagued by
unrest and were periodically shutdown. An unscheduled closure of schools took place
from the 15 to 20 June to pre-empt planned student protests during that period. Mangope
refused to concede that this opposition came from "his" people, blaming the A.N.C. and
its alliance members for infiltrating Bophuthatswana in order to destroy it from within.
Mangope, betweeen May and July 1993, on three occasions called his civil servants to warn
them not to listen to A.N.C. propaganda and not to transfer allegiance to the organisation.
When dissent was expressed he called the civil servants "drunken pigs" and sent them
home. Finally, on the 23 July, in a move which the SABC called "another blow to freedom
of political expression in the country", he warned that any civil servants joining the
A.N.C. of S.A.C.P. or sympathising with them would be fired. The management
structures of BOP Broadcasting and the AGRICOR parastatal were restructured in an
attempt to accomodate the interests and to buy the favour of a section of BaTswana whose
paths to power were blocked by the existing, mainly white, top hierarchies. A major rucus
developed between Mr. Andrew Khutsoane, Head of the Bophuthatswana National
Library Services, and the government, after Khutsoane made public allegations concerning
the integrity and honesty of Mr.Rowan Cronje, a long serving Cabinet Minister and
Bophuthatswana's negotiator at the World Trade Centre. There were indications too that
business interests wwere increasingly uneasy about future prospects if Bophuthatswana
clung tenaciously to its independent status. •
These developments were accompanied with an almost hysterical and anachronistic
rhetoric that linked the A.N.C. to a communist plot to destroy the country, expressed
graphically by the statements made by Mangope on his visit to Latvia. Thus these excesses
painted a picture of a state loosing credibility and desperately trying to maintain its
ground. They also undermined the reasonable and acceptable option of regionalism that
the Mangope administration has worked so hard to present. By the start of 1994
Mangopc's actions and attitudes had clearly begun to alienate intellectuals, students, civil
servants and other sections of the petty bourgeoisie whose support Mangope depended.
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Despite these signs the suddeness of his fall took most people by surprise.However, as the
comments in this introduction indicate, there could be no mistaking the deep seated
antagonism felt towards his rule and his policy of alliance with the far right.
Mangope's 1 egacy and Democratic Practise
In the period following Mangope's overthrow there was a collapse of authority which
could be described as a semi-revolutionary situation. From the outside the Transitional
Executive Council in South Africa assumed control, sending in the South African Defence
Force and establishing an interim office of the "Joint Administrators" to administer the
region. On the ground there was an efforesence of "Staff Associations" formed in
government and parastatal structures in twenty-eight districts of the former homeland to
give expression to local demands and grievances. These structures grew out of "people's
fora" who allegedly elected them to represent them. They subsequently merged into a
structure known as "The Joint Staff Association" which began to advise the office of the
Joint Administrators and to make demands for the suspension of Magope's senior staff.
Subsequently, Mangope's cabinet and senior civil servants, army and police officers were
removed. Unpopular chiefs were forced out of office and banished one's returned. Some
reorganisation of management structures in parastatals and the University began to take
place to give expression to these democratic impulses. In short, it appeared that the region
was experiencing a far more radical break from the past than was the case in South Africa
where the ANG and De Klerk's administration were forging a power sharing arrangement
leading to negotiated democratisation.
However it began to become evident that civil servants' concerns centred as much, if not
more, around the issues of parity in wages and discontent over expatriates or seconded
South African officials than around notions of democratic representation or transparency
in government. The Joint Administrators found themselves facing the same hostile
reaction over salary issues as did Mangope's Ministers, despite President Mandela's
assurances that civil servants in the various administrations in the country would be given
parity in wages.
In the rural areas the return to power of traditional leaders forced out by Mangope does
not neccessarily translate into the establishment of popular democratic practises or
structures. Many might indeed be seeking to establish and entrench political and economic
powers that they had lost in the Mangope years. Moreover Mangope entrenched the
powers of chiefs (provided they supported him) during his rule. This was begun almost
immediately after independence with the Weichers Commission which set in place tribal
authorities with distinct powers. While "this was ostensibly done under the guise of
decentralisation, community participation, rural development and democracy, the
dominance of the state and its bureaucracy was, and remains, the paramount aim.'"''* As
has been noted rural people's lives are shaped around the institution of chieftaincy, which,
with its patriarchal and generational inbalances, is essentially repressive. As Richard
Levin's paper to this Workshop shows, there is in parts of the eastern Transvaal significant
opposition in local communities to the role of chiefs in land allocation and development
44 See M. Lawrence, "Chiefs, Tribal Authority and Village Education", Ne»'_Lo_gk MillUies«)i, July 1
issues that sets the scene for local struggles over land allocation, tribal levies and labour
duties etc.45 The indications are that similar struggles are being replicated in the western
Transvaal. For example in Madikwe region, the ANC stalwart Philemon Mathole,
established in 1991 a civic known as the Committee of Ten to challenge the power of local
chiefs and to demand open governance from them. This example seved as a model for
several other rural populist initiatives in the region.^
It is apparent too that the democratic impulse was felt very differentialy in the former
homeland. Whilst in Mmabatho and the urban areas of the homeland the insurrection did
capture the imagination of most people, it had little impact in remote districts. In Ganyesa
for example reports indicated that people were unsure of how to respond to Mangope's fall
and did not offer any opposition to Mangope supportors.
Some reference needs to be made to the other communities in the region, especially
Mangope's alliance partners, the white right. The severe setback they suffered and the stark
destruction of the illusion of a Tswana \Boere homeland has further embittered this
element. The abject failure of a cross ethnic alliance will undoubedly cause them to fall
back on conceptions of popular democracy based on notions of a common and inherited
consciousness moulded by history, language and experience.
Finally it should be borne in mind that there was a very undeveloped political or
democratic culture in Bophuthatswana. As indicated whilst South Africa liberalised in the
late 1980's, Mangope became increasingly authoritarian. The Trade Union movement was
never allowed to develop, nor was there the emergence of the "civic associations" that
mushroomed in the 1980's, nor was there the same degree of student organisation in the
schools and tertiary institutions. As Lodge has noted these "communal organisations...did
help to change popular attitudes to unjust authority, to alter popular expectations from
goverment, and instill more egalitarian political values". "*'
Thus the legacy of Mangope is somewhat ambiguous. His extremely authoritarian regime
lead to a lack of local popular empowerment, yet its fall left a power vacuum that
institutionally could be exploited to radically challenge relations of power. His ethnic
minded approach created its own blend of Tswana populism which he propagated openly
and it remains to be seen how much appeal this will hold in rural areas within the old
Bophuthatswana.
Conclusion
In conclusion this paper has revealed the changing nature of ethnicity formation in an area
which has hitherto received scant critical attention. We have indicated the transition from
a crude formulation of ethnic identity in the bantustan formation period, based on a
45 R.Levin, "Participatory Research and Democratic Agrarian Transformation: The Case of the Eastern Transvaal
Central Lowveld." History Workshop Paper, Wits University.< July 1994.
4 6 Mathole, a Treason Trialist and Secretary of the Transvaal ANC in the 1950's, was banished to the region in the late
1970(s. See South African Institute of Race Relations-Oral Archive, Interview by A Manson, 1992, and a forthcoming
publication by M.Lawrence, focussing especially on his role in'this community.
47 T. Lodge," South Africa: Democracy and Development in Post-Apartheid Society", Paper to Institute for Advanced
Social Research, Wits University 1994.
notion of precolonial organisation, to a more sophisticated reformulation to provide an
acceptable post-apartheid discourse and political practise as a counter hegemonic strategy in
an period when coalition and alliance politics appeared the order of the day. While not
obscuring the material base of this initiative, it is obvious that the Bophuthatswana
strategy was conceived to find resonance with the ideology of a besieged and threatened
Afrikaner rural constituency itself steeped in decades of socialisation into a perception of
politics premised on notions of ethnicity and nationhood. By presenting this proposal of
political restructuring in an attractive ethnic package Mangope hoped to improve his
chances of mobilising a greater, more respectable and significant constituency. This
platform would then provide the basis from which to launch a serious challenge for rights,
privileges and available resources.
Although the motives and explanations for this bid for power are questionable and flawed
one could argue that it did provide at least a logical option, particularly as regionalism at
that time was finding itself increasingly on the agenda of politicians negotiating South
Africa's future.
Despite the growing opposition to his regime, the suddeness of Mangope's fall took most
people by surprise. At what point precisely he lost control of the process he was engaged
in is hard to pinpoint. Certainly his shift from regional to national politics could be seen as
a crucial turning point in terms of political tactics. However it was the glee with which
most Tswana viewed the shooting of the khaki clad AWB in front of a Mercedes Benz that
best explains the failure of Mangope's vision and political strategy. For the masses in
Bophuthatswana, Mangope's efforts to delve into nineteenth century history to explain the
"kinship" between the Boers and the Tswana were implausible. For most Tswana's their
experiences of life on the farms of the Western Transvaal, of redundancies and removals,
made a mockery of Tswana\Afrikaner unity. For Mangope to align himself with far right
Afrikaners was even more outrageous. It was, like his unfortunate precursor, Moiloa, to
declare himself a willing "Dog of the Boers".
Why though did Mangope not see the folly of his actions? From all accounts he had placed
himself beyond advice from even his cabinet who feared to openly challenge his actions.
Quite clearly he was a victim of his own blinkered vision and believed the apartheid-
created myth that he was a leader of a truely independent state. Incredibly it is clear that he
seriously believed in the fantasies he spun and the opportunistic strategies he employed to
legitimise and prop up his homeland fable. Most of the homeland leaders recognised the
implausibihty of this objective and ensured a semblance of a political future by declaring
for the A.N.C. A leader like Buthelezi, on the other hand could ensure political revival
because he proclaimed a message of ethnic-national unity which had a pronounced appeal
to the Zulu. Mangope however could not overcome the obvious contradiction that a fully
recognised Tswana nation-state existed right alongside the borders of Bophuthatswana, and
the creation of a second, particularly out of an apartheid system, was an impossibility.
Liberal parliamentarianism may have been established in the former Bophuthatswanu bui
the growth of a popular political culture and practise will depend on how sucessfully the
organs of civil society can be built in a region. This will mean overcoming some
limitations. Though not sealed off from the democratisation process, many of the
inhabitants of Bophuthatswana were not extended even the basic democratic freedoms
such as free political expression and association, let alone afforded the opportunity of
experiencing the habits and attitudes gained from engagement with a popular democratic
political culture. In addition it will take some time to rid the region totally of the ethnic
variety of populism expounded by the Mangope regime.
